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SUMMARY:Conference "Behavioral Mechanism Design" [HIM Conference]
DTSTART:20260713T070000Z
DTEND:20260716T140000Z
DTSTAMP:20260916T070400Z
UID:indico-event-306@math-events.uni-bonn.de
CONTACT:him-coordination@hcm.uni-bonn.de\;him-contact@hcm.uni-bonn.de
DESCRIPTION:Speakers: Kanami Ueda\, Emma Seggewiss (HCM)\n\nTrimester Prog
 ram guests\, who were invited and have confirmed to be at HIM during the p
 eriod of this Conference\, are eligible to attend this event without a sep
 arate application.\nResearchers from the HCM\, in particular\, early-caree
 r researchers\, are welcome upon request. Please contact the program coord
 inators\, Emma Seggewiss and Kanami Ueda\, whose email addresses are liste
 d below.\nEveryone will be notified in due time about whether participatio
 n and partial financial support (only for early career researchers) is pos
 sible. After being selected as participant\, you will be invited to regist
 er.\nScientific Organizers:\n\nBenny Moldovanu (University of Bonn)\nPhili
 pp Strack (Yale University)\n\nSpeakers:\n\nCumin Ba (University of Pittsb
 urgh)\nDavid Dillenberger (University of Pennsylvania)\nMira Frick (Prince
 ton University)\nAlex Gershkov (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)\nDanie
 l Gottlieb (The London School of Economics and Political Science)\nPaul He
 idhues (Heinrich-Heine University Duesseldorf)\nPhilippe Jehiel (Paris Sch
 ool of Economics)\nFilip Matejka (CERGE-EI)\nEmre Ozdenoren (London Busine
 ss School)\nCollin Raymond (Cornell University)\nErnesto Rivera Mora (Univ
 ersity of Colorado Boulder)\nJonas von Wagenheim (University of Bonn)   
        \nMengxi Zhang (University of Bonn)\n\n \nDescription:\nThe ou
 tcome of a mechanism is\, from the perspective of an agent\, uncertain ex-
 ante since the other agents’ types are unknown or the mechanism itself r
 andomizes over outcomes. Most work on mechanism design assumes that agents
  maximize their expected utility when faced with uncertainty. There is\, h
 owever\, strong empirical evidence that expected utility theory does not e
 xplain agents’ behavior in common mechanism design settings well. This w
 orkshop aims to promote a more general theory for mechanism design without
  the expected utility hypothesis by combining the expertise on decision-ma
 king under uncertainty in the decision theory community with methods from 
 mechanism design.\n\nhttps://math-events.uni-bonn.de/event/306/
LOCATION:Lipschitz-Saal\, Endenicher Allee 60\, Bonn (Mathezentrum)
URL:https://math-events.uni-bonn.de/event/306/
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