This workshop is directed at the participants in the Trimester Program "Advances in Mechanism Design". It is not possible to apply only for this workshop.
Researchers from the HCM, in particular, early-career researchers, are welcome upon request.
Scientific Organizers:
- Anna Bogomolnaia
- Florian Brandl
Description:
Mechanism design without transfers considers the case in which outcomes are allocations of objects to agents and do not involve monetary transfers between agents. Various legal, ethical, or practical reasons motivate this restriction across many economic domains, including matching markets, social choice, and fair division. The absence of transfers can limit the extent to which mechanism design goals can be achieved. In such cases, the literature focuses on relaxing desiderata such as incentive compatibility and efficiency, introduces substitutes for transfers such as randomization and time-sharing, or studies whether allocations with economically desirable properties can be realized when preferences are not private information. These questions frequently give rise to computational problems for which methods from computer science are useful. The workshop covers a broad range of topics in mechanism design without transfers and features contributions spanning theoretical foundations, algorithmic aspects, and applications.