This workshop is directed at the participants in the Trimester Program "Advances in Mechanism Design". It is not possible to apply only for this workshop.
Researchers from the HCM, in particular, early-career researchers, are welcome upon request.
Scientific Organizers:
- Laura Doval
- Andreas Kleiner
Speakers:
- Agathe Pernoud (University of Chicago)
- Tan Gan (London School of Economics)
- Jan Knoepfle (Queen Mary University)
- Nenad Kos (Bocconi University)
- Elliot Lipnowski (Yale University)
- Nima Haghpanah (Pennsylvania State University)
- Marek Pycia (University of Zurich)
- Vasiliki Skreta (University of Texas at Austin)
- Maren Vairo (University of Pennsylvania)
- Kai Hao Yang (Yale University)
- Fedor Sandomirsky
- Ian Ball (Yale University)
Description:
The workshop brings together research at the intersection of mechanism design and information design. Traditionally, mechanism design studies the design of optimal institutions, taking the information structure as given, whereas information design studies the design of optimal information structures, within a given institution. Recent applications have highlighted the importance of jointly determining mechanisms together with how information is used by the mechanism (e.g., limited commitment, aftermarkets, robust mechanism design) and how the tools of information/mechanism design can be used to answer questions of mechanism/information design (e.g., delegation). The goal of the workshop is to introduce participants to this new frontier of design by showcasing the latest research in the area.